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Abstract 
The public policy doctrine in the conflict of laws has been often characterised as uncertain and 
ambiguous. This article aims to examine the doctrine at common law from a theoretical perspective in 
order to: first, determine whether the substantive considerations which courts have invoked under the 
public policy doctrine are theoretically justifiable; second, discern principled boundaries around the 
courts’ exercise of the defence. Through a study of case law and an examination from first principles of 
the normative basis for the recognition of foreign laws and judgments, this article proposes a set of 
principles that can form the theoretical underpinning of the public policy doctrine, and will examine how 
the proposed principles can provide practical guidance to judges in their application of the public policy 
doctrine. 
Keywords: public policy, conflict of laws, private international law, legal theory, choice of law, 
recognition of foreign judgments 
 
A. Introduction 
Public policy functions as a defence to the well-established rule of the common law that the forum will 
recognise the judgment of a foreign court if certain conditions are met – for example, the foreign 
judgment must be a final and conclusive one on the merits, and the foreign court must have had 
international jurisdiction over the parties. Even if these conditions are met, if recognition of the judgment 
is found to be contrary to the public policy of the forum, the foreign judgment may be refused recognition 
in the forum. 
Public policy is also relevant in the context of choice of law. Even if the relevant choice of law rule of the 
forum points towards the applicability of a foreign law to govern a particular issue, the forum may refuse 
to apply the foreign law if the law itself, or the results of its application, are contrary to the public policy 
of the forum.1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet 
& Maxwell, 15th edn, 2012) at [5-002]-[5-003]. See also Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping Co [1939] 
AC 277.View all notes The application of public policy in this context effectively amounts to an 
overriding choice of law rule in favour of the forum.2 Understandably, courts will be reluctant to hold a 
foreign law in itself as contrary to the forum’s public policy,3 and courts have held that it will only refuse 
to apply a foreign law on this ground in “clear cases in which the harm to the public is substantially 
incontestable”.4 For the avoidance of doubt, any references to the public policy doctrine refers to public 
policy in both the foreign judgments and choice of law contexts, unless specifically stated otherwise. 
Judges and commentators alike have criticised the public policy doctrine as uncertain and ambiguous, and 
have characterised it as a tool of last resort when all other legal options are exhausted.5 This uncertainty 
can be attributed to its open-textured nature, as well as the fact that the public policy doctrine can 
entangle judges with controversial moral and political issues. As an example of how contentious a public 
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policy analysis can be – if a judge is faced with the issue of whether to recognise a foreign law that 
purports to grant full marriage status to a same-sex couple, but there is evidence that the prevailing 
community moral sentiment in his country is not in favour of recognising same-sex unions, can a judge 
justifiably invoke the public policy doctrine to refuse to recognise the foreign law? Or must he take into 
account the potential existence of an international norm in favour of recognition of same-sex marriage, in 
view of the increasing trend of jurisdictions permitting it? If such an international norm indeed exists, 
what should its relationship be with the domestic community norm against recognition of same-sex 
marriages? The public policy doctrine at common law as it stands does not provide judges with guidance 
to navigate these considerations in a principled manner. Exacerbating the inherent ambiguity in the public 
policy doctrine is the fact that public policy considerations may change with time.6 Distinguished 
commentators have pointed out that no attempt to draw the limits around the boundaries of public policy 
has ever succeeded.7  
This article aims to examine the public policy doctrine from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the 
doctrine as it exists in major common law jurisdictions. This analysis is targeted at two main objectives: 
first, to determine whether the substantive considerations which courts have invoked under the public 
policy doctrine are theoretically justifiable; and second, to discern principled boundaries around the 
courts’ exercise of the doctrine. To that end, this article will first conduct a survey of case law to examine 
the types of considerations that judges have invoked in their application of the public policy doctrine. 
Next, the theoretical framework underlying and justifying the courts’ practice of recognising foreign 
judgments and foreign laws will be studied. With an understanding of the theoretical foundations of the 
recognition of foreign judgments and foreign laws, we will be in a better place to analyse how the public 
policy doctrine fits within this bedrock of principle, and what justifications can be proffered for the public 
policy doctrine within this framework. This article will then propose a set of principles that can form the 
theoretical underpinning of the public policy doctrine, and consider whether the courts’ invocation of the 
various types of norms under the public policy doctrine is normatively justifiable. The final section of this 
article will examine how the proposed principles can provide practical guidance to judges in their 
application of the public policy doctrine. It should be noted from the outset that in view of this article’s 
emphasis on the normative justifications of the public policy doctrine, the analysis in this article is 
directed at the practice of judges in applying the public policy doctrine in major common law 
jurisdictions at a broad level, rather than an examination of jurisdiction-specific private international law 
rules. 
B. Background 
Before proceeding with the discussion proper, it will be helpful to first describe the general approach that 
courts have taken to the public policy doctrine. The public policy doctrine has been described as the only 
avenue through which the substance of the foreign judgment or law can be questioned.8 In view of the 
inherent ambiguity in the public policy doctrine, common law courts have approached the doctrine with 
great caution. Indeed, the approach they have taken towards the doctrine has been characterised as being 
marked by “judicial restraint” and requiring “the greatest circumspection”.9 Commentators have also 
agreed that such restraint is desirable – otherwise, the rules of private international law may potentially 
fade in importance, and the exception would become the rule.10 As a manifestation of this caution, courts 
have required a very high threshold to be met before allowing the invocation of the public policy doctrine. 
To that end, some judges have drawn distinctions between types of public policy. One such distinction is 
that between domestic public policy and “international” public policy – domestic public policy expresses 
the public policy of the forum, while “international” public policy refers to public policy norms which are 
applicable in private international law.11 On this view, only foreign judgments or laws which are contrary 
to “international” public policy will be denied recognition in the forum. This distinction, along with a 
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potential third category of “transnational public policy”, a subset of “international” public policy, will be 
discussed later in this article. At this juncture, it suffices to note that this distinction can result in differing 
outcomes for the same subject matter between purely domestic actions and foreign judgments.12 For 
instance, even if the courts would be unwilling to recognise a domestic gambling contract for reasons of 
local public policy, the courts may be open to recognising a foreign judgment based on a gambling 
contract.13 As another example of a distinction drawn between types of public policy, the Singapore Court 
of Appeal in Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc 14 (“Poh Soon Kiat”) suggested that there is a distinction 
between common law public policy and statutory public policy.15 In the Court of Appeal’s view, statutory 
public policy ought to be applied more readily than common law public policy. 
Another distinction that courts have made in their application of the doctrine is between the cause of 
action in the foreign court and the effect of enforcement of the foreign judgment. The public policy 
doctrine has generally been held to operate only if the effect of the foreign judgment’s enforcement in the 
forum is contrary to public policy, in order to avoid a perception of over-intrusiveness in foreign judicial 
proceedings. To that end, courts are very careful in their characterisation of the issues before them – if the 
issue before them is determined to be sufficiently distant from the problematic foreign law or cause of 
action, the courts may be willing to uphold the foreign judgment or apply the foreign law accordingly.16 
Notably, the English Court of Appeal decision in Israel Discount Bank of New York v Hadjipateras 17 has 
been criticised for failing to draw this distinction by appearing to accept the proposition that a judgment 
based on an agreement obtained through undue influence is contrary to English public policy.18  
C. Categories of public policy considerations 
In view of the prevailing narrative of ambiguity surrounding the public policy doctrine, a study of the 
types of substantive considerations the courts have invoked in their application of the public policy 
doctrine, coupled with a theoretical analysis of whether the invocation of these considerations is 
justifiable, may yield useful insights into the justifiable limits of the public policy doctrine. 
A survey of cases across major common law jurisdictions in which the public policy doctrine has been 
invoked, whether successfully or unsuccessfully, reveals that the courts have applied three main 
categories of substantive considerations under the doctrine: fundamental moral norms, community norms 
expressed in statutes and common law, and community norms independent of statutes and common law. 
In deciding cases, judges sometimes apply considerations across more than one of these categories, and 
some norms may fit into more than one category. Nevertheless, the existence of such overlaps does not 
detract from the usefulness of these categories as a foundation for discussing the justifications of the 
different types of public policy considerations. 
1. Fundamental morality 
In the first category of justifications, the courts invoke norms that are suggested to be universal moral 
norms or fundamental principles of international law which are in turn expressions of universal moral 
norms.19 If a norm in this category is invoked, the courts have evinced a strong willingness to refuse 
recognition of a foreign judgment or apply a foreign law. Courts have described norms within this 
category as “fundamental public policy”, which would most strongly justify the application of the public 
policy doctrine.20 Indeed, the oft-cited statement of Cardozo J in Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York,21 
that courts should only apply the public policy doctrine if “some fundamental principle of justice, some 
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal”22 is violated, 
clearly envisions that fundamental moral norms are intended to be a key consideration in the public policy 
doctrine. This was also explicitly recognised in Lemenda Trading Co Ltd v African Middle East 
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Petroleum Co Ltd,23 where the court held that “some heads of public policy are based on universal 
principles of morality”.24 
Case law is replete with examples of judges applying norms in this category. For instance, in 
Oppenheimer v Cattermole,25 public policy was invoked to prevent recognition of a Nazi law that 
purported to deprive German Jews who were ordinarily resident abroad at the date of the decree of their 
right of citizenship. Lord Cross took the view that “a law of this sort constitutes so grave an infringement 
of human rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all”.26 Thus, the 
House of Lords applied a norm which it characterised as a fundamental and universal norm of human 
rights. As another example, in Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor,27 the House of 
Lords was faced with the issue of whether to recognise an Iraqi decree that purported to nationalise the 
aircraft of Kuwait Airways – this was effectively a seizure of the Kuwaiti aircraft by the Iraqi government 
following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The House of Lords held that even though this case did not 
involve human rights directly as compared to the situation in Oppenheimer v Cattermole, recognising or 
enforcing the Iraqi law would be “manifestly contrary”28 to English public policy on the basis that the 
Iraqi decree amounted to “flagrant violations of rules of international law of fundamental importance”.29 
The usage of such language is a clear reference to the universality of the norm sought to be invoked. 
Academic support can be found for this practice of invoking universal moral norms and fundamental 
principles of international law under the public policy doctrine. Chong has argued for the emergence of a 
new category of public policy called “transnational public policy”, which comprises universally accepted 
principles of morality and justice as well as international law principles.30 She suggests that norms in this 
category include fundamental human rights norms, and may also include particularly egregious examples 
of bribery and corruption.31 In addition, Paulsen and Sovern argued that it is necessary to “admit a 
principle of reservation from the normal choice of law rules on the grounds of fundamental ideas of 
justice”, lest the courts become “the hand-maidens of tyrants”.32 This can be achieved by incorporating 
“basic moral conceptions” or “ideas of fundamental justice” in the public policy doctrine in the conflict of 
laws.3333 Ibid at 1015.View all notes Along the same lines, Oster took the view that human rights are a 
fundamental component of the public policy doctrine in view of their universal importance.34 As such, he 
argued that courts ought to take a much more permissive view in their application of the public policy 
doctrine where human rights are involved. 
2. Community norms expressed in statute and common law 
In addition to fundamental and universal moral norms, courts have also invoked other types of norms to 
justify their application of the public policy doctrine. These are norms that express principles of morality 
or certain interests unique to the particular community the court is situated in. To determine the content of 
such community norms, courts often have regard to local statutes and common law jurisprudence. Indeed, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Boardwalk Regency Corp v Maalouf opined that evidence of the content 
of public policy may be derived from “the total body of the constitutional and statute law as well as the 
case law of the forum, since it will reflect the local sense of justice and public welfare”.35 The existence of 
this category of public policy considerations was explicitly recognised in the Singapore Court of Appeal 
decision in Poh Soon Kiat 36 as well, in its discussion of the relationship between statutory and common 
law public policy. 
As a preliminary note, with respect to the community norms expressed in statutes in particular, it should 
be observed that this category of public policy considerations is related to the choice of law concept of 
forum mandatory rules that apply regardless of a parties’ choice of law. Indeed, forum mandatory rules 
have been described as “crystallised public policy”.37 However, the “public policy” expressed in forum 
mandatory rules may not be entirely congruent with public policy in the context being discussed in this 
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article, since the applicability of forum mandatory rules rests not on the rules being expressions of 
morality or fundamental values, but mainly on statutory interpretation and legislative intention.38 Another 
noteworthy distinction between forum mandatory rules and the public policy doctrine is that forum 
mandatory rules are generally applied in a positive manner, while public policy is applied negatively. 
Another preliminary issue that should be addressed is how exactly this category of norms should be 
applied as part of the public policy doctrine. If norms expressed in statutes and common law can be the 
justification for the court’s refusal to recognise a foreign judgment or foreign law, would this mean that 
all foreign judgments and foreign laws are invalid in the forum as long as they are unlawful by the 
forum’s standards? Such an approach has not generally been favoured. The California Supreme Court has 
rejected a “difference in law” approach, thus declining to find that unlawfulness in and of itself can be a 
reason for the invocation of the public policy doctrine.39 Indeed, the preferred approach of judges is to 
require something more to justify the application of the public policy doctrine, beyond mere 
unlawfulness. In the New York Court of Appeal decision of Schultz v Boy Scouts of America, the court 
held that to make out the public policy doctrine, beyond a reference to statutes and common law, one had 
to establish that enforcement of the foreign law would violate some form of fundamental or community 
moral norms – borrowing Cardozo J’s description of the public policy doctrine in Loucks v Standard Oil 
Co of New York. The approach of the common law jurisdictions in this regard is paralleled in the Brussels 
I Regulation as well – courts are prohibited from applying the public policy doctrine solely because there 
is a difference in law between the foreign court and the forum.40  
Further support for the proposition that more is required beyond mere unlawfulness for the public policy 
doctrine to be invoked can be found in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Boardwalk Regency Corp 
v Maalouf.41 In this case, the respondent sought to resist the recognition of a default judgment obtained in 
New Jersey for a failure to pay a gambling debt. The Court of Appeal considered that the Ontario Gaming 
Act placed restraints on gambling contracts in Ontario, but that the existence of the Gaming Act in itself 
did not necessarily mean that this was an expression of public policy against the recognition of all 
judgments on gambling debts. Indeed, in the words of Carthy JA in the Ontario Court of Appeal, “it 
cannot be every statutory statement or prohibition which raises this defence or little would be left of the 
principle of comity underlying conflict of laws jurisprudence”.42 The court found that for the Gaming Act 
to be invoked as an expression of public policy, it needed to express “the community’s sense of morality”, 
which was described as moral norms running through “the fabric of society” and based on “our system of 
justice and general moral outlook”.43 The court ultimately held that a refusal to recognise the New Jersey 
judgment based on an approbation of gambling licenced in New Jersey would be inconsistent with the 
existence of licenced gambling in Ontario, and decided to recognise the New Jersey judgment. In addition 
to lending support to the proposition that mere unlawfulness is insufficient to invoke the public policy 
doctrine, this decision is significant for the fact that it recognised a category of public policy 
considerations based on essential community norms derived from legislation, beyond the fundamental and 
universal norms discussed in the earlier section. 
Courts have invoked a wide variety of statutes and common law principles in this category of the public 
policy doctrine. For instance, courts have grappled with the question of whether enforcement of a foreign 
judgment may be refused under the public policy doctrine where the judgment provides for punitive or 
manifestly excessive damages.44 While this issue has not been conclusively settled,45 if judgments can be 
refused recognition or enforcement on this ground, then the public policy invoked would stem from the 
approbation of punitive or manifestly excessive awards in the forum’s common law of damages. Another 
set of public policy considerations that falls within this category would be public policy against the 
recognition of foreign judgments which have been obtained in disobedience of an anti-suit injunction 
against proceedings in that foreign court. The English Court of Appeal in Phillip Alexander Securities & 
Futures v Bamberger 46 approved of Waller J’s statement at first instance that “if someone proceeds in 
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breach of, and with notice of, an injunction granted by the English court to obtain judgments abroad, 
those judgments should not, as a matter of public policy, be recognised in the United Kingdom”.47 The 
Singapore Court of Appeal in WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka 48 agreed 
with this statement, and added that “it would be manifestly against public policy to give recognition to the 
foreign judgment at the behest of the defendants who have procured it in breach of an order emanating 
from this court.”49 Although not made explicit in these decisions, this species of public policy may be 
analysed as deriving from a legal principle providing for the protection of the processes of the forum 
court, expressed in the legal doctrines of abuse of process and contempt of court. 
In addition, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Poh Soon Kiat opined, without expressing a definite 
conclusion on the matter, that the public policy doctrine ought to be invoked against foreign judgments on 
gambling debts, based on the general public policy encapsulated in section 5(2) of the Civil Law Act, 
referred to earlier.50 Notably, the Court of Appeal considered whether the existence of regulated gambling 
in Singapore weighed against this public policy, especially in view of previous Singapore decisions to 
that effect,51 but found that such activities merely indicated that regulated gambling was not contrary to 
public policy, leaving the general public policy imperative in section 5(2) intact. It is clear from this case 
that the Singapore Court of Appeal, in discerning the content of public policy, had regard to statutes as 
legitimate sources of public policy. 
In another example of a reliance on law as an expression of norms relevant to the public policy doctrine, 
the Singapore Court of Appeal in Yap Chai Ling v Hou Wa Yi found that it was a principle of Singapore’s 
legal system to recognise only monogamous marriages, and opined that the Singapore courts would thus 
refuse to recognise bigamous marriages as a matter of public policy in relation to marriage.52 Although 
the Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to invoke this head of public policy in this case, the court’s 
reasoning in this case clearly evinces a reference to legal norms in the forum as indicative of the content 
of public policy. 
In In Re Macartney,53 the public policy doctrine was invoked to refuse recognition of a foreign order that 
required the defendant to pay maintenance to a child beyond the period of the child’s minority, based on 
established rules of English family law which denied recognition of the permanent rights of illegitimate 
children and their spinster mothers. Notably, the judge distinguished the public policy he based his 
decision on from “general morality”,54 lending support to the argument that norms invoked as part of the 
public policy doctrine go beyond universal moral norms. 
In Vervaeke v Smith,55 the plaintiff sought to enforce a decree of nullity from a Belgian court in England, 
when the English court in an earlier decision had already upheld the marriage. The marriage was 
effectively a marriage of convenience. The House of Lords in Vervaeke v Smith found that recognition of 
the Belgian decree was unenforceable due to the principle of res judicata in English law. Notably, the 
House of Lords held that in any case, it would be contrary to fundamental principles of English marriage 
law to allow the courts to invalidate validly formed marriages on the mere basis of a change of mind or 
mistaken intentions or beliefs at the time of marriage.56 It is worth noting that this norm that the House of 
Lords sought to invoke as public policy derived from English law. 
Vervaeke v Smith is of particular significance for another reason. The House of Lords considered in its 
decision that “civilised nations deplore the transaction above (the marriage of convenience) as morally 
indefensible”.57 Nevertheless, the House of Lords found that this did not necessarily mean that English 
public policy had to take the same position. The reasoning of the House of Lords thus acknowledges the 
existence of a category of public policy considerations based on uniquely forum-based norms, and 
touches on one of the main topics of discussion in this article – how should the existence of such local 
norms interact with the fundamental and universal norms used more commonly in the public policy 
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doctrine? What is the relationship between the different categories of norms? Should the norms claiming 
universality always trump domestic community norms? These issues will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this article. 
3. Independent community norms 
The final category of public policy considerations that courts have invoked are also forum-focused in the 
sense that they are not derived from universal moral norms, but are expressed by courts to be community 
norms and interests worthy of protection through the public policy doctrine. However, in contrast to the 
norms discussed in the preceding section, the norms applied by the courts in this category do not have a 
clear link to any statute or common law principles of the forum. Through an examination of case law, one 
may observe that courts have sometimes invoked norms derived from judges’ general assessments of 
public sentiments and the moral standards of the community, or from their assessment of national policy 
interests, to justify the application of the public policy doctrine. 
For example, in the Singapore Court of Appeal decision of Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees,58 the 
court decided that the public policy doctrine did not apply to prevent the registration of an Australian 
judgment on a gambling debt under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act 
(“RECJA”). In determining whether the public policy doctrine ought to apply, the Court of Appeal 
affirmed its previous decision in Star City v Tan Hong Woon 59 (“Star City”) that gambling per se was no 
longer contrary to public policy in Singapore. The court held that registration of the Australian judgment 
on a gambling debt would not “offend a fundamental principle of justice or a deep-rooted tradition of 
Singapore”.60 Notably, in coming to this decision, the Court of Appeal had regard to the general moral 
sentiments of Singaporeans, finding that there was no evidence that “the general community in Singapore 
would be offended by the registration of a foreign judgment on a gambling debt that was incurred in a 
licensed casino”.61 In fact, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the “prevalent conception of good 
morals in the Singaporean community at large” militated against Singaporeans evading responsibility for 
their gambling debts incurred overseas.62 These considerations were particularly noteworthy for the fact 
that the Court of Appeal, in determining what substantive norms were protected under the public policy 
doctrine, had regard to moral norms of the community that were discerned through the judges’ own 
assessments of prevailing moral sentiment in Singapore. 
The reference to community moral norms as observed by judges was continued in the later Singapore 
Court of Appeal case of Poh Soon Kiat. In this case, the Court of Appeal disagreed with its previous 
statements in Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees and Star City that gambling per se was not contrary to 
Singapore’s public policy, holding that unregulated gambling and gambling on credit remained contrary 
to public policy in Singapore.63 In support of this decision, the Court of Appeal first made reference to the 
“elaborate legislative and regulatory framework” in the Casino Control Act,64 which suggested that 
gambling was still viewed in Singapore as an activity which needed to be strictly controlled. This was an 
invocation of a community moral norm expressed in statute – the category of norms discussed in the 
preceding section. However, the Court of Appeal also went on to consider that the 2006 and 2007 
National Council of Problem Gambling Reports evinced that the “prevalent public sentiment” with 
respect to gambling remained a negative one, thus justifying its view that gambling per se remained 
contrary to the public policy of Singapore.65 This represents an implicit recognition by the Singapore 
Court of Appeal that relevant community moral norms applicable to the public policy doctrine can be 
derived from sources beyond statutes and common law. 
Looking beyond Singapore, judges in other common law jurisdictions have also relied on such norms in 
their application of the public policy doctrine. In the Ontario Court of Appeal decision of Boardwalk 
Regency Corp v Maalouf, Lacourcière JA made explicit reference to the requirement of a “community 
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standard” in the invocation of the public policy doctrine, and held that “in accordance with the Canadian 
community standard, the participation in licensed gaming abroad, and the enforcement of a foreign 
judgment based on a gaming debt incurred in a licensed and regulated casino, are neither immoral nor 
unjust”.66 Indeed, he opined that “the contemporary Canadian community standard of morality would 
prefer that personal responsibility be attached to Canadians who engage in licensed gaming activities 
abroad and that these citizens not be sheltered from enforcement proceedings when debts result”;6767 Ibid 
at [27].View all notes a statement which might have inspired the similar holding in the Singapore Court 
of Appeal decision of Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees. In addition, in the New York Court of 
Appeal decision of Intercontinental Hotels Corpn v Golden,68 the issue before the judge was whether to 
allow an action in New York to recover gambling debts valid under Puerto Rican law. The judge held that 
the public policy doctrine did not apply to prevent the recovery of these gambling debts, given that “the 
New York public does not consider authorized gambling a violation of ‘some prevalent conception of 
good morals (or), some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal’”.69 Notably, in coming to his decision, 
the judge held that the court should have regard to the prevailing social and moral attitudes of the 
community which is reflected not only in the decisions of our courts in the Victorian era but sharply 
illustrated in the changing attitudes of the People of the State of New York.70  
The widespread publication in New York newspapers of betting odds in sports was found to demonstrate 
an acceptance of licensed gambling transactions. “Informed public sentiment” was only against 
unlicensed gambling.71 These judicial statements in Intercontinental Hotels Corpn v Golden evinced an 
application of community moral norms derived not from statutes or common law, but from the judge’s 
evaluation of prevailing moral sentiments of the time. 
It should be noted that some judges have displayed some reluctance to apply such norms in the public 
policy doctrine. Indeed, at first glance, allowing judges’ inferences of the state of moral norms in the 
community to block recognition of foreign judgments or laws may seem like an arbitrary exercise. In the 
English case of Fender v St John-Mildmay,72 the court held that public policy should not depend upon 
“the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds”, and that it should instead “only be invoked in clear 
cases in which the harm to the public is substantially incontestable”.73 This was cited with approval by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees as well. However, one should be 
careful to note that even if one applies the principle in Fender v St John-Mildmay strictly, this is not a 
rejection per se of the category of community moral norms independent of statutes and common law; 
rather, the decision merely states that the only relevant moral consideration the courts should consider in 
this category of norms is the harm principle, and nothing else. 
Under this category of norms, the existence of a clear government policy in favour of or against the norm 
the judge is seeking to apply in the public policy doctrine may be interpreted by judges as evidence of a 
public policy norm. For instance, the Court of Appeal in Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees cited the 
Singapore government’s intention to develop casinos in Singapore as a factor supporting its decision that 
gambling was not against the public policy of Singapore.74 A subsequent shift in the prevailing 
government policy discourse from the question of whether to develop a casino to the issue of the legal 
controls necessary to protect Singapore’s social fabric from the imminent establishment of the casinos 
may have played a role in the reversal of Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominees by the Court of Appeal in 
Poh Soon Kiat on the point of Singapore’s public policy on gambling. But what happens if there is a 
disconnection between the relevant government policy and the prevailing community moral sentiment? 
How would judges discern the applicable public policy? This raises interesting philosophical and political 
questions about the proper role of judges in a democratic society, and different jurisdictions may arrive at 
different reasonable answers to these questions. It is suggested that an entire separate work can be 
meaningfully devoted to discussing these issues, and a considered discussion of these questions will have 
to be left to another occasion. 
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Judges have also invoked norms in this category that are not overtly based on an assessment of 
community moral norms, but are nevertheless public policy considerations independent of statutes and 
case law. For instance, courts have generally refused to enforce an agreement within the forum which has 
the intention or object of contravening the law of another country on its territory. Such cases can be 
characterised as based on a public policy norm in favour of protecting the national interest.75 This norm is 
not expressed in common law or statute, but arises from a judicial assessment of the national interest in 
maintaining harmonious relationships with foreign nations. Cases in this category include the English 
Court of Appeal decision in Foster v Driscoll,76 where the Court of Appeal declined to enforce an 
agreement entered into for the purpose of smuggling whisky into the US during the Prohibition. The 
House of Lords decision in Regazzoni v K C Sethia (1944) Ltd 77 also falls into this category. In this case, 
the House of Lords refused enforcement of an agreement to export jute from India to Italy, when both 
parties were aware that the jute was to be subsequently re-exported to South Africa in contravention of an 
Indian embargo against exports to South Africa in protest against apartheid in South Africa. While the 
governing law of the relevant agreements in both cases was English law, leading commentators have 
opined that this principle is likely to apply even if English law is not the governing law of the contract78 – 
thus, this principle can be properly characterised as one of public policy. 
4. Summary of case law review 
From the preceding review of cases on the public policy doctrine in the conflict of laws, it will be 
observed that judges have applied various types of norms under the umbrella of the doctrine. The 
application of each type of norm is not restricted to specific contexts as well – courts apply the above-
mentioned three categories of norms across many different contexts. 
As a consequence of the potentially limitless range of considerations that could fall under the public 
policy doctrine, the courts have scant guidance to delimit their exercise of discretion under the doctrine. 
The question is whether it is indeed possible to draw principled boundaries around the exercise of the 
public policy doctrine. This is the inquiry to which the rest of this article will be devoted. 
D. Justifying the recognition of foreign judgments and laws 
To obtain a clearer understanding of the principles underlying the public policy doctrine, it will be useful 
to first consider the principles which underlie the recognition of foreign judgments and laws. Discerning 
the specific principles underlying this area of law will allow for better resolution as to the normative 
justifications that should apply to the public policy doctrine. As noted in the introduction of this article, 
this analysis is intended to seek the normative justifications at a broad level for the practice of 
recognising foreign judgments and laws in the common law, rather than seeking the justifications for 
specific private international law rules. 
A useful starting point for any discussion of the principles underlying the recognition of foreign 
judgments and laws at common law is the principle of territoriality. Indeed, it is a trite principle of 
international law that “every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its 
territory”.79 As a natural corollary of this principle, laws or judgments which carry the imprimatur of a 
particular sovereign state “extend prima facie to all those within each sovereign’s jurisdiction, and are to 
be enforced in all its tribunals – but no further”.80  
In view of the principle of territoriality, why then should the forum apply foreign law or recognise foreign 
judgments at all, when doing so may favour a foreigner’s interests over those of a citizen of the forum?81 
Why should the courts of the forum recognise within its own jurisdiction a judgment or law that carries 
the imprimatur of another sovereign state? In the context of the recognition of foreign law, various 
 10 
 
 
theories have been offered to explain and justify this practice. One historically important example was the 
vested rights theory. Simply put, under the vested rights theory, human behaviour at a particular time and 
place vests rights in a person under the only law applicable to that person82 – as such, when the forum 
recognises these rights, it is not creating any new rights but merely recognising an existing vested right 
created by the foreign law.83 However, this theory has since suffered significant criticism.84 Indeed, 
among others, a major issue with the vested rights theory is that it begs the question – judges should only 
recognise vested rights, but how do they determine whether and which rights are vested in the first 
place?85 The vested rights theory also came under withering attack from scholars identifying with the 
legal realist school of jurisprudence, who argued against what they saw as the formalistic nature of choice 
of law rules.86 In what would come to be known as the local law theory, these legal realists proposed that 
judges should base their decisions on choice of law issues by openly weighing the different policies 
engaged in each matter, rather than cloaking the true nature of their decisions through the use of 
formalistic rules.87 However, the local law theory has come under significant criticism itself – 
significantly, for its failure to provide a normative vision as to how the law in this regard ought to 
develop; a criticism which may equally be levelled at the legal realist movement upon which this theory 
finds its jurisprudential grounding.88  
In contrast to the above theories which can be characterised as positivist and territorial theories of private 
international law, the eminent jurist Savigny in the nineteenth century offered a markedly different 
account of private international law.89 He argued that the private international law rules providing for the 
recognition of foreign laws stem from universal principles binding on all nations – specifically, that as a 
community of nations, private international law rules should provide for an orderly resolution of legal 
disputes and aspire towards avoiding a conflict of legal orders.90 On this view, the courts’ practice of 
recognising foreign law is justified on universal norms of international ordering, closely related to the 
principle of international comity. Notably, Savigny’s account saw private international law as linked to 
international law norms binding on all nations, as opposed to being a matter of domestic and territorial 
law. However, this view was criticised due to scepticism over its foundations in natural law, and 
subsequently did not play a major role in private international law jurisprudence.91 At present, due to a 
modern tendency to separate private international law from public international law, the prevailing view 
is that the former is seen as a matter of positivist law – a matter for individual jurisdictions, analysed 
through the behaviour of individual states.92  
As for the recognition of foreign judgments, judges originally believed that the justification for the 
recognition of foreign judgments rested in international comity or reciprocity – courts in different 
jurisdictions should render assistance to each other as members of an international community, and giving 
effect to foreign judgments is necessary in order to ensure that other jurisdictions would in turn give 
effect to the forum’s judgments.93 At present, a theory which continues to be accepted in various common 
law jurisdictions to explain the recognition of foreign judgments is the obligation theory. In short, this 
theory provides that when a foreign court of competent jurisdiction makes a pronouncement over a 
person, this creates an obligation on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum so awarded.94 
This obligation to pay a simple debt is an obligation which the courts of other jurisdictions are “bound to 
enforce”.95 The key issue determining whether a foreign judgment should be enforced in the forum is 
whether the appropriate connection exists between the foreign court and the defendant concerned, as 
determined by the conflict of laws rules of the forum.96 In common law jurisdictions, this has been called 
the requirement of international jurisdiction. 
It is suggested that a universalist account of the practices of recognising foreign judgments and foreign 
law is the best means of justifying and explaining these practices. Indeed, it has been argued persuasively 
that a universalist conception of private international law can enhance the coherence, effectiveness and 
clarity of this area of law, as well as do justice to the historical foundations of private international law.97 
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Further, if doing justice to the expectations of parties is a fundamental justification for the choice of law 
rules, as has been argued by other commentators,98 it is suggested that this notion of justice can find its 
jurisprudential basis as a norm of justice of universal relevance and application, expressed in international 
law. 
The appeal of a universalist account is buttressed by the inadequacies of the alternative theories. The 
weaknesses of the alternative theories seeking to justify the recognition of foreign law have been 
mentioned above. As for the recognition of foreign judgments, one should take a closer look at the 
obligation theory – simply put, the obligation theory states that if the appropriate connection exists 
between the foreign court and the person against whom a judgment is rendered i.e. the foreign court has 
international jurisdiction over the defendant, this creates an obligation on the defendant to pay a certain 
sum, and this obligation should be recognised by the forum. But why should the existence of international 
jurisdiction give rise to an obligation on the defendant that the forum court should recognise?99 The 
obligation theory is hard-pressed to find an answer to this question, beyond saying that the obligation 
arises because of the existence of international jurisdiction, which would then be a circular argument. 
In defence of the obligation theory, Briggs has suggested that where international jurisdiction is founded 
on the concept of presence, this obligation may be justified on the basis of voluntary presence, or on “the 
common law understanding of international law principles of territoriality, comity and sovereignty”.100 
Where international jurisdiction is founded on the concept of submission, the obligation is founded on the 
basis of agreement.101 Two points will be made in response. First, to the extent that Briggs suggests that 
consent may be invoked as a justification for the obligation theory even where international jurisdiction is 
founded on presence, the connection between consent and presence is tenuous.102 While it is a factual 
possibility, the defendant’s presence in the foreign jurisdiction may not necessarily be equated with his 
consent to the foreign court’s jurisdiction over him. Second, and more fundamentally, one still must 
justify why consent to the foreign court’s jurisdiction is sufficient to create a binding obligation on the 
defendant within the forum to obey the foreign judgment.103 If one were to refer to “the international law 
principles of territoriality, comity and sovereignty” in aid of a justification for the obligation theory,104 
this raises the question as to whether it is these higher order principles which provide the fundamental 
normative basis for the importance of the concept of consent, and thus provide the true justification for 
the courts’ practice of recognising foreign judgments, rather than the obligation theory. 
The relevance of a universalist conception of private international law was alluded to by the English 
Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries.105 In the context of the recognition of foreign judgments, 
while the Court of Appeal accepted the obligation theory, the Court of Appeal also saw the need to 
provide justifications at a higher level of abstraction to justify the obligation theory itself – Slade LJ held 
that the overarching reason for recognising the obligation created by the foreign court must stem from an 
acknowledgement that the society of nations will work better if some foreign judgments are taken to 
create rights which supersede the underlying cause of action, and which may be directly enforced in 
countries where the defendant or his assets are to be found. (emphasis added)106  
Another reference to the role of international norms in this area of law can be found in von Mehren and 
Trautmans’ seminal work on the recognition of foreign judgments – they argued that among other 
policies, an important rationale for the recognition of foreign judgments rests in “an interest in fostering 
stability and unity in an international order in which many aspects of life are not confined to any single 
jurisdiction”.107 In the same work, in a statement worth quoting in full, the learned authors opined:  
The ultimate justification for according some degree of recognition is that if in our highly complex and 
interrelated world each community exhausted every possibility of insisting on its parochial interests, 
injustice would result and the normal patterns of life would be disrupted.108  
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It is interesting to observe that underlying von Mehren and Trautmans’ seminal work on the policies 
underlying the recognition of judgments is an ultimate justification which is at its core an appeal to a 
norm of international law, which may also be characterised as a universal norm of justice – an idea 
equally applicable to the recognition of foreign laws, and indeed reminiscent of Savigny’s view of private 
international law. 
One may argue that the obligation theory, as well as the vested rights and local law theories, may be more 
properly described as directed at the question of which judgments and laws should be recognised, rather 
than providing theoretical justifications as to why judgments and laws should be recognised.109 Indeed, 
these theories may never have been intended to provide a normative justification for the recognition of 
foreign laws and judgments. However, in order to answer the “which” question more effectively, it may 
be useful to provide an answer to the “why” question. Should one accept a universalist conception of 
private international law, then one would seek to justify the courts’ practices of recognising foreign 
judgments and laws with reference to a norm of international law. 
But what exactly is the content of the international norm that justifies the courts’ practice in this regard? 
One possibility is the concept of reciprocity – that the court of the forum should recognise foreign 
judgments and laws so that foreign courts will do so in return. The principle of reciprocity was affirmed 
by the US Supreme Court decision in Hilton v Guyot.110 However, the principle of reciprocity has since 
been disapproved of as a ground for the recognition of foreign judgments in several English decisions,111 
and most recently in the UK Supreme Court decision in Rubin v Eurofinance SA,112 where Lord Collins 
held that “there is no necessary connection between the exercise of jurisdiction by the English court and 
its recognition of the jurisdiction of foreign courts, or its expectation of the recognition of its judgments 
abroad”. Even within the sphere of matrimonial judgments, where some support may be found for the 
principle of reciprocity,113 judges have disapproved of it as a basis for the recognition of foreign 
judgments.114  
It is suggested that the principle of international comity can serve as a normative meta-principle justifying 
the courts’ practice of recognising foreign judgments and laws.115 Specifically, it is argued that the 
normative basis of the recognition of foreign judgments rests in a norm of international comity common 
to all jurisdictions that the community of nations should work towards the orderly resolution of disputes 
in different jurisdictions around the world. Indeed, in the context of international arbitration, an analogous 
principle has been suggested by Gaillard as the juridical foundation for the recognition of arbitral awards 
around the world.116 The identification of such a principle is particularly important in the context of 
international arbitration, since a crucial question that arbitration theory must answer is whether and why 
arbitrators have the juridical legitimacy to hear disputes and make awards deserving of enforcement 
internationally.117 While in the context of foreign judgments and laws, judges clearly have power derived 
from their sovereign national institutions to make pronouncements on recognition, Gaillard’s argument is 
still relevant in this context as a normative justification for judges to exercise this power. As for the 
normative grounding of this norm, scholars have suggested that such a transnational norm may find its 
jurisprudential roots in natural law theory118 – evoking a return to Savigny’s theory of private 
international law. Alternatively, Gaillard suggests that this norm can also find its philosophical foundation 
in transnational positivism, based on “the normative activity of States” generating norm-creating facts,119 
in accordance with Kelsenian positivism.120  
Thus, there is an argument to be made that the recognition of foreign judgments and laws finds normative 
justification from a supranational principle of international comity that the community of nations should 
provide for the most reasonable and just allocation of jurisdictions for the resolution of disputes between 
international commercial litigants.121 Acceptance of this justificatory principle places us in a better 
position to evaluate whether the exceptions to the recognition of foreign judgments, such as the public 
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policy doctrine, have been applied in a normatively justifiable way. It is to this subject that this article will 
now turn. 
E. Justifying the public policy doctrine 
The public policy doctrine in the recognition of judgments and laws is required to strike a balance 
between two competing principles: the principle of international comity identified earlier, and the 
countervailing need to safeguard fundamental human rights and community norms. A clearer conceptual 
understanding of the principles governing the recognition of foreign judgments and laws can shed some 
insight as to how the public policy doctrine can strike this difficult balance. Indeed, one would observe 
that the universal norms of international ordering which have been argued above to justify the courts’ 
practice of recognising foreign judgments and laws may be helpful in drawing principled boundaries 
around the public policy doctrine. Since such norms form the justification for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments and laws, it stands to reason that the justifications for their non-
recognition and enforcement on the ground of public policy should be formulated in relation to these 
norms. 
It is suggested that there is theoretical room for the proposal of a priori principles that can justify and 
guide the courts’ application of the public policy doctrine. This article proposes two normative principles 
of universal application. 
First, the public policy doctrine incorporates a universal norm of justice in itself, insofar as a judgment or 
law offensive to fundamental and universal moral norms should not be recognised in any nation in the 
community of nations.122 If one accepts that the recognition of foreign judgments and laws is justified on 
the basis of a norm in favour of the orderly resolution of disputes around the world to serve the interests 
of justice, then it stands to reason that this norm must be tempered by other universal norms of justice as 
well. These universal norms of justice may be found in expressions of international law, the generally-
accepted practices of nations, as well as self-evident norms of natural justice discernible through 
reason.123 Judges have long applied such norms as justifications for invoking the public policy doctrine to 
invalidate foreign judgments and laws – indeed, the examples of judicial applications of public policy 
based on fundamental moral justifications described earlier in this article serve as evidence of the 
existence of this principle. Also, Mills’ concept of relativity in the public policy doctrine124 may be 
viewed as a practical expression of this first principle, such that the stronger the argument that a norm 
concerned is of fundamental and universal application, the more likely it is that the forum will invoke the 
public policy doctrine. 
This principle is relatively uncontroversial. However, judges have not restricted themselves to applying 
fundamental moral norms in their application of the public policy doctrine. As described earlier in this 
article, judges often refer to community moral norms whether expressed in law or otherwise as 
justifications for the invocation of the public policy doctrine. Is this practice justifiable? 
It is suggested that a second normative principle applies in relation to the public policy doctrine. This 
norm is an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of individual nations even though they are situated within 
a broader framework of international ordering. It provides that a foreign judgment or law can be refused 
recognition or enforcement if to do so would represent a danger to essential community interests or 
institutions in the forum. Indeed, a considerable amount of the discourse surrounding the public policy 
doctrine from judges and academics alludes to the existence of this principle.125 In the context of the EU 
regime, the European Court of Justice in R v Bouchereau 126 held that  
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the concept of public policy presupposes, in any event, the existence, in addition to the 
perturbation of the social order which any infringement of the law involves, of a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental 
interests of society.127  
The distinguished jurist Sir Hersch Lauterpacht argued that as an encapsulation of fundamental moral 
norms, the public policy doctrine is “part and parcel of the entire doctrine and practice of private 
international law almost from its very inception”, and serves as a “safety valve” allowing a state to 
decline to apply foreign law “because of the very nature of [the forum state’s] structure and the 
fundamental legal, moral and political conceptions which underlie it”.128 Mills’ concept of proximity may 
be viewed as an expression of this second principle, to the extent that judges are more likely to invoke the 
public policy doctrine where the dispute concerned is more closely related to the forum. 
This second principle is certainly not new to the realm of the conflict of laws. A well-established doctrine 
that is an expression of this principle is the doctrine of forum mandatory rules. The justifications for the 
existence of forum mandatory rules to protect local institutions apply equally to the context of foreign 
judgments. Indeed, the existence of forum mandatory rules lends support to the idea that a key principle 
of private international law is the protection of local institutions. Recognising this principle in the context 
of foreign judgments provides symmetry in both the choice of law and foreign judgments contexts. 
Notably, if one has regard to the expression of forum mandatory rules in the Rome I Regulation, it will be 
observed that it bears strong similarities to the second principle proposed here – Art 9(1) of the Rome I 
Regulation defines forum mandatory rules as “provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a 
country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation”.129  
It is worth reiterating at this point that the two principles are proposed a priori justifications of the public 
policy doctrine as applied by the courts. The difficult question is how these principles themselves can be 
justified. It is suggested that they can find normative grounding in the philosophical principle of 
subsidiarity. At its essence, the principle of subsidiarity suggests a means of demarcation of authority in a 
hierarchical power structure.130 It proposes a bottom-up system of social ordering – that is, associations at 
the lowest levels of hierarchy should be accorded the autonomy to pursue their own ends and achieve 
their own flourishing, while associations at the higher levels should not have the authority to interfere in 
the decisions made at the lower levels of associations, save where such interference is necessary to protect 
the common good of the entire hierarchy of association.131 This system of social ordering is intended to 
protect individual autonomy and conserve state resources,132 with an implicit assumption that individuals 
and lower levels of associations will have the best idea of what is necessary for their own flourishing. In 
the context of international law, the principle of subsidiarity suggests that overarching principles of 
international law should not detract from the autonomy of sovereign states to enact laws and govern 
themselves, except where absolutely necessary for the protection of the international order.133 
Commentators have raised the legal structure of the European Union as an example of the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity at an international level.134  
The principle of subsidiarity offers a normative justification for the reservation of a “margin of 
appreciation”135 to states within the framework of international ordering to protect their community 
interests and institutions. At the same time, the principle of subsidiarity provides that in certain situations, 
overarching principles of international law should be able to override the policies of national authorities 
to protect fundamental or universal principles, such as where fundamental human rights are involved.136 
As such, the principle of subsidiarity provides the philosophical bedrock and normative grounding for the 
two a priori principles suggested here. In addition, the principle of subsidiarity suggests how the two 
principles ought to interact with each other. In the application of the public policy doctrine, individual 
states should be given the authority to decide what is necessary to protect the good functioning of their 
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community institutions, and it should only be in exceptional circumstances where fundamental and 
universal norms are in question that the individual states’ judgments on the matter should not be 
conclusive.137  
It is suggested that accepting that these principles provide the theoretical justification for the public policy 
doctrine would allow us to justify the courts’ practice of invoking the substantive considerations 
highlighted earlier in this article. When judges refer to fundamental and universal moral norms in their 
invocation of the public policy doctrine, they are essentially invoking the first principle, which provides 
that a judgment or law offensive to fundamental moral norms should not be enforced anywhere in the 
community of nations. When judges refer to community norms expressed either in law or otherwise, they 
are invoking the second principle, which reserves to sovereign states the authority to protect their own 
community interests and institutions through the public policy doctrine. 
The proposed relationship between the two principles as informed by the principle of subsidiarity allows 
us to examine if the reasoning of judges in this regard is normatively justifiable. For instance, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal’s accordance of high weight to statutory public policy in Poh Soon Kiat is 
substantially justifiable, on the assumption that statutory public policy provides stronger prima facie 
proof of the importance of the community norm to be protected. However, the Court of Appeal’s 
preference for statutory public policy over what it defined as “common law public policy” is difficult to 
justify within this normative framework, insofar as the category of “common law public policy” overlaps 
with fundamental and universal norms of international law or morality. It is suggested that in view of the 
normative justifications for the public policy doctrine as proposed in this article, the relevant distinction is 
not whether the norm sought to be protected through the public policy doctrine stems from statute or 
common law, but whether it is a fundamental moral norm or not. 
A question may be posed at this juncture: how would the principles apply in jurisdictions which adopt a 
dualist approach with respect to the relationship between international law and domestic law? In a dualist 
system, international legal norms are only binding in the state to the extent that they have been expressed 
in domestic law.138 Indeed, the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in Poh Soon Kiat that statutory 
public policy takes priority over international norms can be seen as an expression of Singapore’s dualist 
approach towards international law. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the existence of dualist states does 
not detract from the two principles proposed above. The principles proposed here are normative in nature 
and not descriptive. As such, these principles should hold over both monist and dualist systems to provide 
normative justifications for the types of norms invoked by courts in the public policy doctrine. Indeed, in 
dualist systems, the principles espoused here can be seen as providing justifications for the international 
norms in question to be incorporated in domestic law. 
F. Practical implications on the application of the public policy doctrine 
Beyond providing theoretical justifications of the categories of norms that judges have invoked under the 
public policy doctrine, identifying the theoretical underpinning of the public policy doctrine also provides 
guidance as to how the courts can shape their practice in view of these insights. 
The two principles suggested in this article can provide more concrete guidance for judges in their 
application of the public policy doctrine. This is especially so when the two principles are read together 
with Mills’ thesis. In short, Mills argued that the applicability of public policy depends on a function of 
relativity, proximity, and seriousness of the breach.139 Relativity of the public policy concerned refers to 
the extent to which the public policy is shared among the international community. The higher the degree 
of consensus among the international community for the existence of a particular norm, the more likely 
the courts will find the public policy doctrine to be applicable based on that norm. As for proximity, Mills 
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argued that the closer the connection between the dispute concerned and the forum, the more willing 
courts will be to invoke the public policy doctrine as well. As such, even if the norm concerned does not 
enjoy broad international consensus, courts may still be willing to invoke the public policy doctrine on the 
basis of that norm if the dispute at hand is closely connected to the forum. Regarding seriousness of the 
breach, Mills suggested that the degree to which a particular norm has been violated is a factor in a 
judge’s decision to invoke the public policy doctrine as well. 
On one level, the two principles proposed in this article justify Mills’ thesis by providing a theoretical 
explanation for the courts’ use of relativity and proximity in their reasoning, as comprehensively 
elucidated in Mills’ research. On another level, the two principles proposed here may serve to refine 
Mills’ thesis in two ways. 
First, with respect to Mills’ point on the relativity of norms, it is suggested that the strength of a norm is 
not solely based on the degree of consensus at the international level. Consensus should be an indicator of 
the strength of a fundamental moral norm, but not conclusive in this regard. This is derived from the 
nature of the first principle as based on the universality of moral norms, evoking concepts such as natural 
law and fundamental human rights. The universality of fundamental human rights norms or objective 
moral norms in natural law is not based on consensus; rather, consensus is the effect of the universality of 
a norm. Fundamental human rights do not derive their binding character from consensus, but are self-
evident moral norms common to humanity.140 As such, on this view, the first principle refines Mills’ 
concept of relativity by emphasising that the relevant focus is on the fundamental and universal character 
of the norm in question, not merely on the degree of international consensus. 
Second, with respect to Mills’ point on proximity, the second principle proposed here provides additional 
detail to the concept of proximity. The second principle suggests that the relevant question in the analysis 
of proximity is whether recognition of a foreign judgment or law should be refused on the ground of 
public policy in order to achieve the legitimate protection of important community interests and 
institutions. Beyond this, the formulation of the second principle also serves as a guide as to the type of 
relevant considerations that courts may justifiably take into account in the public policy doctrine. 
For instance, considering the category of independent community norms, it will be observed from the 
discussion of case law earlier that the courts have taken the view that they are merely declaring what the 
collective moral convictions of the community are, as evinced in various forms beyond the law. This 
justifiably raises the issue of the limits around the exercise of such judicial discretion – are judges free to 
declare moral norms as they please to refuse recognition to foreign judgments and laws? It is suggested 
that the second principle provides some degree of principled boundaries to the exercise of judicial 
discretion in this regard by constraining judges to the protection of community moral norms essential to 
the functioning of community institutions. Thus, for example, in the context of the recognition of foreign 
judgments on gambling debts, refusal to recognise the foreign judgment would only be justified if the 
court is able to discern that a disapproval of gambling forms a fundamental tenet of the community’s 
moral ecology. The difference in the outcome of this inquiry thus explains the differing outcome in Poh 
Soon Kiat, as compared to Boardwalk Regency Corp v Maalouf and Intercontinental Hotels Corpn v 
Golden. 
Admittedly, this still leaves the issue as to what amounts to a moral norm essential to community 
institutions. It is suggested that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate boundaries with 
mathematical precision in the area of public policy. Nevertheless, the second principle proposed here at 
least provides additional guidance with respect to the relevant inquiry that must be satisfied for the public 
policy doctrine to be made out – which is more guidance than exists in the law at present. 
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To this end, it should be noted that the UK Supreme Court’s approach to the contractual doctrine of 
illegality in Patel v Mirza 141 may provide useful guidance as to how to conduct this inquiry. In Patel v 
Mirza, Lord Toulson suggested that in determining whether a claim under a contract tainted by illegality 
should be allowed, the court should have regard to the purpose of the public policy contravened by the 
contract, any other relevant public policies, as well as whether it would be a disproportionate response to 
disallow the claim in view of the nature and seriousness of the wrongdoing.142 A similar approach could 
be taken in the context of the recognition of foreign judgments and laws, applying the second principle 
suggested above – the court should have regard to the nature of the community moral norm that would 
potentially be contravened by the recognition of a foreign judgment or law, consider whether the norm is 
of such an essential nature to community institutions that upholding this norm would constitute a policy 
concern of a higher order than the countervailing policy of international comity, and determine whether 
refusal of recognition would be a proportionate response in view of the degree to which the foreign 
judgment or law has contravened the moral norm. Indeed, Mills’ argument that the seriousness of the 
breach is a consideration courts should take into account in the public policy doctrine also lends support 
to the application of a proportionality analysis in this area of law. This inquiry applies equally to the 
category of community norms expressed in common law and statute, save for the fact that in this category 
of norms, there should be a stronger presumption of the essential character of these norms for the 
community where the norms have been expressed in common law or statute. 
Returning to the example posited in this article’s introduction, one will observe that the two principles 
suggested here can provide some principled boundaries around judges’ application of the public policy 
doctrine. In considering whether to recognise a foreign law allowing same-sex marriage where there is 
good evidence of community moral sentiment against the recognition of same-sex marriage, the judge 
will first have to consider whether there exists a fundamental norm of justice with respect to the 
recognition of same-sex marriages. In this regard, the judge may consider the increasing number of 
jurisdictions giving legal recognition to same-sex marriages around the world. However, the judge will 
also have to consider the fact that same-sex marriage remains a controversial moral and political issue and 
that the issue is by no means settled. Given the inconclusiveness of the existence of same-sex marriage as 
a fundamental human right at this stage, the judge should then consider the community moral sentiments 
on the matter, as evinced through local laws and statutes or otherwise. If there are local laws which 
clearly express a disapproval of homosexual acts, then the judge has a strong justification for refusing to 
recognise the foreign law. If not, but he finds that community moral sentiments evince a particular vision 
of the community’s conception of the family which may be affected by a recognition of same-sex 
marriage, and also that a refusal to recognise the foreign law would be a proportionate response on the 
facts of the case before him, then under the public policy framework offered in this article, he can 
justifiably refuse a recognition of the foreign law. 
G. Conclusion 
This article has sought to take a theoretical perspective to the public policy doctrine in the recognition of 
foreign judgments and laws in an effort to provide principled boundaries around the application of a 
doctrine often criticised as amorphous and arbitrary. By identifying the theoretical basis underlying the 
recognition of foreign judgments and laws, and consequently situating the theoretical justification of the 
public policy doctrine within that context, this article has identified two principles that undergird the 
public policy doctrine: first, a judgment or law offensive to fundamental and universal moral norms 
should not be recognised in any nation in the community of nations; second, a foreign judgment or law 
can be refused recognition or enforcement if to do so would represent a real danger to essential 
community interests or institutions in the forum. This article has suggested that these principles serve to 
justify the types of norms that courts have invoked in the public policy doctrine, as well as provide 
 18 
 
 
practical guidance for the application of the doctrine. It is hoped that this article will contribute to greater 
clarity in the law in this regard. 
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